URGENT TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

Nandyala S
P.P.O. No.
CAMP IN CHA
Hyderabad
Fo
Constituted

COMMUNIST PARTY PUBLICATION

URGENT TASKS
OF THE
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

COMMUNIST PARTY PUBLICATION

No. 8 — *May 1969* (C 334)

C-88254

This is a document prepared by the underground Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia in February 1969. The English translation closely follows the original Dutch text. The subheadings have been supplied by us.

Price: 50 paise

Printed by D. P. Sinha at New Age Printing Press, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 55 and published by him for Communist Party of India, 4/7 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi 1. *Editor*: M. B. Rao

POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER ARMY COUP

TODAY, WITH THE TERROR REGIME established in Indonesia as a result of the right-wing coup accomplished during the latter months of 1965 by internal reactionary forces, the destiny of the Indonesian revolution depends on the unity and determination of all the democratic and anti-imperialist forces, on the ability of the party of the working class on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist programme and employing Marxist-Leninist tactics, to restore its forces and become the leader of the revolution.

To restore the Communist Party (PKI) on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and on the foundation of the general line of the international communist movement many tasks have to be carried out, among them important ones like uniting Marxist-Leninist elements organisationally and ideologically; restoring the people's confidence in the Communist Party; combating both right- and "left"-wing opportunism; forming a united front of left democratic forces on the basis of an alliance between the workers and peasants; a persevering struggle by the Party to win over the masses through an active defence of the vital interests of the masses; utilising all forms of class struggle, including legal possibilities; military preparation of the party cadres for an armed struggle.

History shows that although communist parties have suffered defeat, they nonetheless re-emerged, mustered strength, entered the front ranks of the revolutionary struggle of their respective peoples and won an honourable place in the international communist movement. This has been borne out by the experience of the PKI itself. But "re-emergence after defeat" does not come of itself. It is achieved by a struggle by party

members capable of withstanding gruell ng trials remaining loyal to the cause of the party and the people and displaying enough bravery to reconsider critically the experience of the past.

The rout of the party after the events of the 'September 30th Movement' had such far-reaching consequences that today the Indonesian communists have, in effect, 'to begin from the beginning" under far more difficult conditions than in the past.

Since the events of the "September 30th Movement" the balance of forces in Indonesia has changed drastically. Because of fr ght and prostration, all the forces previously allied with the party have now left the ranks of the national unity front. Part of the middle forces, which, within certain limits, had adhered to a 'middle line", have now swung to the right, but as further developments show these forces are still undecided, especially in face of the activities of the ultra-right-wing groups.

The present regime in Indonesia is a military fascist dictatorsh p. The Armed Forces the army in particular, are the backbone of this regime. Its political mainstay consists of the big bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic capitalists, the bureaucracy in the Armed Forces and the civil service as well as in the corrupt parties, the profiteers and plunderers of state property, the feudal and semi-feudal landowners and other exploiters in the countryside, the compradores and other groups economically interested in the large-scale infiltration of foreign capital. These were the social forces behind the reactionary coup in 1965-66 and the establishment of the military fascist dictatorship

The regime now in power in Indonesia has nothing in common with the interests of the masses· it is an anti-popular regime.

The working class of Indonesia finds itself in unbearable conditions. In a situation marked by total economic dislocation, the workers are unable to earn a livelihood for themselves and their families and, in addition, are denied the legal possibilities for waging a struggle for an improvement of their economic

position. Essentially, they have been deprived of their right to work and are constantly faced with the threat of dismissal and unemployment. The plight of the plantation workers of whom there are vast numbers, is the most difficult of all the wages are very low and they are employed for only a few months in the year. Female and child labour is ruthlessly exploited on the plantations. By opening the door to foreign capital the present regime sells the workers of Indonesia into bondage to the old and new colonialists. The Armed Forces have in fact, become the watchdog of foreign capital interests.

The working peasants, who form the bulk of the population of Indonesia, have lost even the little they had gained with the help of the communists, from the Basic Regulations on Agrarian Principles adopted in 1960. The feudal lords and rich peasants instituted a reign of terror on a huge scale in the countryside after the PKI was routed. Frightened into inertness, the peasant masses see no prospects for the future. Championing the interests of the rural exploiters, the authorities in Indonesia flatly refuse to implement the Basic Regulations on Agrarian Principles and the Basic Regulations on Crop Division and actively help the landowners and rich peasants to retrieve the land allocated to landless and land-starved peasants, and maintain and, in practice, approve the most ruthless forms of exploiting the peasants. They are wiping out the last vestiges of autonomous administration in the villages. Having destroyed the peasant progressive organisations, they have created all the conditions for unbridled brutality on the part of the landowners.

The events that followed the failure of the "September 30th Movement" strongly influenced the destiny of the national bourgeoisie. The intense activity of the foreign monopolies and the flourishing of "domestic" bureaucratic capital tied up with foreign monopolies are strangling the genuinely national entrepreneurs, who are unable to compete with them. The urban petty bourgeoisie and especially the artisans are becoming bankrupt and are unable to maintain even the minimum living standard.

The large numbers of intellectuals who received their training during the national revolution are likewise in unhappy circumstances. The most grevious circumstances are experienced by tens of thousands of teachers, who have been thrown out of their jobs by the present regime. Most intellectuals in Indonesia have always been in the front ranks of the fighters for a genuinely national art and for social progress. The brutal persecution to which the people's intelligentsia is subjected, apart from being inhuman, directly harms the national interests.

Openly pro-imperialist, ultra-right-wing forces, headed by the Masjumi and right-wing socialist elements, are now appearing on the scene. In the Armed Forces they depend on the support of adherents of the reactionary generals. They thirst for power and want to turn Indonesia unconditionally into a political and military bridgehead of US imperialism in Southeast Asia.

The ruling military fascist dictatorship is itself multiplying the ranks of the forces which will oppose and ultimately bury it. These ranks consist of workers, peasants, artisans, intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie and so on and so forth.

MAOIST DISRUPTION OF PARTY GROUPS

Many party leaders perished and a large number of functionaries and hundreds of thousands of party members died in the white terror, which ran amuck after the events of 30 September 1965. Organisational contacts were largely disrupted. To date our party does not have a united central leadership. Those who toady to Peking are, by their splitting activities, undermining the as yet numerically small underground forces. This is fertile ground for the appearance of renegades, traitors and provocateurs. In its effort "to annihilate all communists" and "to weed out the remnants of the PKI to the last", the present regime pays a great deal of attention to undermining underground party groups from within, by recruiting and infiltrating agents into them. The activities of these agents result in arrests and annihilation of hundreds of communists and give rise to anxiety and fear among some sections of the underground organisation.

The Maoists in Indonesia ignore the fact that the party has been routed and disorganised. To uphold Mao Tse-tung's "thought", they want to go so far as to throw the remnants of the party against the bayonets of the generals, although no revolutionary situation exists at present and, after their defeat, the revolutionary forces are in a state of despondency and disorganisation. In other words, these people continue to push the party to the old road of leftist adventures, which have led to defeat.

This activity clashes with the interests of the working class of Indonesia and of its vanguard, the communists. It serves the "great power" interests of the Maoists. In their efforts to foist on the communist movement in Indonesia the slogans calling for an "immediate armed struggle of the people" and for the "encirclement of the town by the village", the Maoists seek to force Indonesia to take the suicidal course that has brought it to an impasse, isolated many communist parties in Southeast Asia from the masses and held up for some years the development of the revolution in a number of countries in Southeast Asia. Nothing save condemnation is deserved by these individuals who claim to be communists. Although they criticise the personality cult which once infected the PKI, they ignore class interests and national dignity, and worship and extol the personality of Mao Tse-tung.

It is important to draw attention to the bitter fact that by means of deceit and by playing up the errors that have been committed in the past, the party's enemies have succeeded, for the time being, in depicting communists as an "anti-national" force in the eyes of a part of the people. That is why the new adventures which some individuals, styling themselves leaders, want to press on the party give the party's enemies an additional weapon for sustaining the anti-communist delirium.

Moreover, the communist ranks are being infected by the dangerous disease of liquidationism, i.e., the discontinuation of all party activity. This springs from the wavering and fear in some circles of the underground organisation. These threats,

both from the "left" and the right, menace the very existence of the communist movement in Indonesia.

PATH FORWARD

The Programme and the Rules of the Communist Party of Indonesia stress that nonviolent parliamentary struggle is the best, ideal way of achieving the transition to a people's democratic system, which is the preparatory stage of the socialist system. If everything depended on the communists, the nonviolent road would be chosen. Besides, the Programme and Rules of the PKI provide for the possibility of violence, because we know from experience that the exploiting classes do not relinquish power voluntarily. That is why the working people must always be prepared for either a nonviolent or an armed struggle.

If today the question is asked whether the military clique will voluntarily relinquish the state power it has usurped even if its unpopularity is proved by "general elections", the only answer we can give is—"No!" Nobody must harbour the illusion that in Indonesia the generals and reaction as a whole will voluntarily surrender power at the request of the working people.

For that reason, as a result of the changed balance of forces, the communists, being the most conscious political force, are obliged to chart, on the scientific foundation of Marxism-Leninism, new tactics combining international revolutionary experience with the specific conditions obtaining in Indonesia today.

At present, in view of the weakness of the revolutionary forces, the communists must pursue a policy aimed at changing the balance of political forces in favour of the working people and the development of the revolutionary situation. The success of this policy will depend on both objective and subjective factors: the unmasking of the present regime by the failure of its home policy, the break-down of the "new order", and political work by the communist organisation among the masses.

Political activity must be directed at explaining to the working masses the indisputable fact that the present regime cannot solve the economic and political problems confronting the Republic of Indonesia. These problems can only be solved by an anti-imperialist, democratic national government. Mass action by the democratic forces of the Indonesian people must be organised against the military fascist dictatorship with the purpose of overthrowing the antipopular regime.

In order to counterbalance the class enemy, which is armed to the teeth and wields state power, we must have, in addition to a strong political organisation, our own military detachments, i.e., armed forces of the revolution, which will, at the appropriate time, support the mass actions of the democratic forces in town and countryside aimed at overthrowing the antipopular regime.

The Marxists-Leninists of Indonesia hold that it would be premature to launch armed action before the completion of painstaking revolutionary work of a preparatory nature, before the emergence of a clear-cut revolutionary crisis that would bring about a revolutionary situation, before the formation of an organised and highly influential Marxist-Leninist party as the nucleus capable of heading the armed struggle and ensuring it with the mass support of the forces allied to the working class. This is an indispensable condition of the success of revolutionary action. Without this condition such action would be an adventure objectively playing into the hands of the counter-revolution, for it would enable the numerically-superior enemy to cut the bleeding remnants of the party to pieces. Every effort must be made to preserve these remnants in order to create a Marxist-Leninist organisation in Indonesia which, in cooperation with other democratic forces, would prepare the ground for the overthrow of the military fascist dictatorship and its replacement by a democratic national government.

Retaliation against the butchers should be prepared by gathering all forces into a powerful fist. Ultra-revolutionary phrases about the "immediate armed struggle of the people" and the

"encirclement of the town by the forces of the village", borrowed from the arsenal of others, are ridiculous because they do not conform to the real situation in Indonesia and can only lead to the squandering and annihilation of the revolutionary forces that have survived the September tragedy. Although the present situation does not favour the communists of Indonesia, the military detachments now being formed by the party can and must take retaliatory action against the acts of terrorism and crimes of the present regime. Such action must be planned to envisage sudden attack, a quick retreat and secure hiding places. The butchers must know that they will not escape retaliation.

It is imperative to appreciate fully the actual state of affairs no matter how bitter it may be. This by no means implies the cessation of the revolutionary struggle. An objective, accurate assessment of the balance of forces is absolutely vital for the success of the struggle. Only a frank and honest analysis of the situation will make it possible to work out the most suitable course for this struggle. Lenin teaches that "only *conformable* resistance to reaction serves the cause of the revolution" (the word "conformable" was emphasised by Lenin). Lenin said: "Today we are faced by oppressors. It would be most correct to reply to oppression with a revolutionary war, with an uprising, but, regrettably, history teaches that oppression cannot always be countered by an uprising, although renunciation of an uprising does not signify a renunciation of the revolution."

Today it is important to restore and unite an unencumbered and independently-thinking communist party on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism, to revitalise its role of vanguard in our country, its role of fighter for national independence and socialism.

FOLLOW INTERNATIONAL GENERAL LINE

Besides, a communist party can function successfully in its country if its activities dovetail with the fulfilment of its internationalist proletarian duty.

The defeat of the PKI has inflicted considerable damage on the international communist movement: one of its contingents has been routed and the errors of the PKI leadership have been clearly twisted by the anticommunist reactionaries and presented to the people as being "the general line of world communism". Besides, some individuals, who aspire to the leadership of the PKI without any rights, use new phrases to screen the old course, which has ended in a fiasco, portraying it as conforming to Marxism-Leninism and thereby objectively helping to discredit the ideas of communism in Indonesia.

In this situation, in addition to denouncing the old adventurist course, it is important to show that it fundamentally clashes with the general line of the international communist movement. It is quite obvious that to adopt the course urged by Mao's agents means to betray the cause of communism, to neglect the interests of one's people and to desert the ranks of the world anti-imperialist front.

The history of the revolutionary struggle of the PKI shows that as long as its leadership championed the interests of the working people, pursued an independent policy in line with the will of the majority of the working people and thus served the interests of the Indonesian nation as a whole, this policy represented a contribution to the common cause of the world revolution and had the support of the international communist movement.

Marxists-Leninists in Indonesia stand in great need of the solidarity and support of all fraternal parties. Throughout the world these parties expose the provocative tactics of reaction, which, by accusing the whole of the PKI of the adventure of 30 September 1965, has routed the party and accomplished a rightwing coup in the country.

The international communist movement has emphatically condemned the anticommunist terror in Indonesia. The fraternal parties have made statements in defence of communists and members of democratic organisations who have been arrested and sentenced without grounds.

The international communist movement has scored further successes in its efforts to restore unity in the struggle against imperialism, for peace, national independence and socialism. An International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties is to be held in Moscow in May 1969.*

Indonesian communists, who adhere to Marxism-Leninism, are free of Maoist influence and are guided by the spirit of proletarian internationalism, wholeheartedly support the desire of the fraternal parties to strengthen the internationalist solidarity of communists and cement their unity in the struggle against imperialism.

Indonesian communists regret that due to the situation in their country they could not take an active part in the preparations for the meeting, but they express their solidarity, support and readiness to make every possible contribution towards the success of the meeting.

Being internationalists, the Indonesian communists cannot confine themselves to national problems however important and urgent they may be. The communist movement in Indonesia cannot be isolated from the international communist movement, from the forces of world revolution and socialism. In the present situation when the forces of imperialism, headed by the United States, are accentuating their aggressive policy and seeking to attack socialism, democracy and peace, the internationalist duty of all Marxists-Leninists in Indonesia is to work for the unity of all communist, democratic and progressive forces in order to give a rebuff to imperialism.

The communists of Indonesia express their profound solidarity with the peoples fighting imperialist aggression. We admire the courage of the fraternal Vietnamese people, who are heroically fighting the heavily armed United States Army. We express our solidarity with the peoples of the Arab countries who are subjected to acts of aggression by Israel, which is supported by

* This has been since postponed to 5 June 1969.

the imperialists of the USA, Brita n the Federal Republic of Germany and other imperial st states

After the severe ordeals at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, the PKI reconsidered and drew conclusions from its experience and framed a strategy that was inscribed in the Party Programme (5th Congress of the PKI) In particular, in this Programme it is stated that soc al sm is the prospect before the revolution in Indonesia and that the task at the present stage is to form a peop c's democrat c government, wh ch the party regards as a government of the national unity front representing all the anti-imper alist and antifeudal forces and carrying out democratic reforms In this front—w thin the framework of its tasks—the work ng class must play the lead ng role. Resting on the powerful revolut onary movement of the masses, above all, on its vanguard i e, the work ng class the communists, as envisaged by the Programme m ist stead ly guide the proletariat into the leading pos tion in the revolut on The congress stressed that the revolution in Indones a would be a long and intricate process.

FIFTH CONGRESS PROGRAMME DISTORTED

In the course of a number of years th s strateg c line ensured major successes for the party. But later the Programme was distorted and buried beneath left st deviat ons and r ghtwing opportunism. Without any foundat on at all the Programme was depicted as be ng aimed d rectly at the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletar at. Moreover, some people rejected the Programme, calling it "opportunist and revis onist". They arbitrarily invalidated the decisions of the 6th Congress, tried to seize the leadersh p of the communists of Indonesia and continued to impose on them deviations of all k nds, which ultimately developed into a totally new strategy, which harmed the party and brought about its defeat

These people reproached the PKI leadership not for having deviated from the Party Programme, but, on the contrary, for having, in their opinion, not deviated enough from the Pro-

gramme, for having failed to bury it completely. At the same time, the criticism levelled against deviations from the strategic line was used demagogically to discredit the line itself. This disgraceful method was used by them to justify the failure of the adventurist policy imposed by the Maoists in their own interests.

The course towards an alliance with the anti-imperialist forces of the national bourgeoisie, with the simultaneous maintenance and strengthening of the political independence of the proletariat, was replaced by the leaders of the PKI with a policy, which, in effect, served the interests of the bureaucratic capitalists, who appeared on the scene under the Sukarno administration. The PKI leaders pinned their hopes on winning power "with Sukarno as the screen" and by means of intensive infiltration into the state apparatus.

Some leaders of the Central Committee and members of the "Delegation of the PKI in Peking" drew the conclusion from the failure of this altogether erroneous policy that an armed uprising of the peasants is the only and absolutely indispensable method of revolutionary struggle in any situation. On top of that, what they feared most was the objective answer to the question: "Who is to blame?" In defending themselves, they seek to put all the blame on Comrade D. N. Aidit, who fell in the struggle, bypassing the question of who pushed Comrade Aidit and the entire PKI leadership onto that disastrous road.

"SELF-CRITICISM" AND CHINESE PATH

This shameful intention is strikingly borne out by a document entitled "Self-Criticism of the Political Bureau of the CC PKI" distributed in the underground communist organisation. Although they drew many correct conclusions regarding the shortcomings and errors of the PKI, the compilers of this document did not set themselves the aim of restoring the party's independent Marxist-Leninist line which would conform to the obtaining situation. All they sought was to parry accusations from party members, so that these accusations would not hit

the leaders responsible for the distortion of strategy and tactics which brought about the party's defeat.

The eyes of the authors of this document continue to be blurred by the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung, and for this reason they are unable to draw up an independent programme of action and persist in urging that the party adopt the Peking-inspired course, an adventurist course which has clearly collapsed.

Is the following theory correct: "The only way to achieve victory in our revolutionary struggle is to rally the peasant masses in the countryside to a guerrilla war under the leadership of the workers' party, launch an agrarian revolution, set up bases in the countryside, surround the town by the countryside and, finally, capture the town and liberate the whole country"? Looked at superficially, this theory seems to be correct. Every Marxist-Leninist realises that a military fascist dictatorship cannot be overthrown by nonviolent means. Such a regime will not surrender without putting up a resistance. It can be overthrown only as a result of an armed struggle, and the forces of reaction must be opposed by the popular forces.

But the above theory does not say how these forces are to be built up. Yet the authors of the "Self-Criticism" want Indonesia to adopt the "Chinese road" and, at the same time, they criticise Comrade Aidit particularly for having in the 1950s repeatedly stressed the difference between the situation in China and in Indonesia. To set up a liberated area on China's outskirts near the frontier of a socialist state is quite different from trying to set up such an area on the small island of Java with its dense population where every inch is exposed to enemy fire. To fight the Japanese colonialists and their puppets with the support of the bulk of the population, as was the case in China, is quite different than trying to start an armed uprising in the present situation in Indonesia, where the overwhelming majority of the people does not yet realise that an armed struggle is the only way to overthrow the regime, which has betrayed the national interests of our country.

We can ask those who always maintained that the difference of geographical location between China and Indonesia has no significance at all: What would have been the fate of the Chinese Red Army if after the defeat in 1934 it had been unable to retreat over a distance of thousands of kilometres? The communists of Indonesia do not have such a vast region behind them.

Those who give themselves out as "leaders of the Communist Party of Indonesia" said nothing about the necessity for a struggle for the day-to-day needs of the workers and peasants. But if communists do not head this struggle, the workers and peasants will not consider them consistent champions of their interests. In such a situation who will stir the workers and peasants to an armed struggle?

It is indeed necessary to set up party bases in the countryside so that the peasants, particularly the poorest peasants who form the vast majority, can resolutely side with the communists and become a faithful ally of the workers and a major force in the revolution. However, these bases must become primarily political bases for thorough-going and scrupulous political and ideological work so that it would be possible first and foremost to counteract the poison of anticommunism, neutralise the anti-communist activities of reactionary religious organisations and bring the truth of Marxism-Leninism to the peasant masses. In other words, we must work without haste yet perseveringly so as to restore the good and glorious name of the PKI in the countryside and make the peasants realise that it is precisely the communists who are fighting for their vital interests.

The fundamental distinction between the situation in China in the 1940s and the present situation in Indonesia is that the Communist Party of China was already then the tested and influential vanguard of the Chinese people in their struggle against imperialism and feudalism, while we are confronted with the task of restoring the party's forces and reviving the faith of the working people in our ability to fight, to head the struggle of the people and lead them to victory. Only people

completely isolated from reality can presume that the methods of carrying out this task will be absolutely identical with the tactics used by the Chinese communists in the 1940s.

The passive and one-sided orientation for our relations with the communist parties of other countries, as suggested in the "Self-Criticism", does not represent anything new. This is precisely the orientation that was adopted by the PKI leadership in 1963-65, i.e., when the attacks on the fraternal parties were started. This orientation, which in effect contributed to the split in the international communist movement, to a large extent isolated the PKI in the international arena, weakened its positions in face of reaction and helped Suharto and others to attain their criminal objectives.

In armed struggle victory does not fall from the sky. Nobody can foretell exactly what form the armed struggle will take: whether it will be a people's uprising that will break out in one of the large towns or in the countryside, or whether it will be a guerrilla war that will steadily spread and grow fiercer. However, in both cases the following precious words by Lenin hold true:

> "To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced class. That is the first point. Insurrection must rely upon *a revolutionary upsurge of the people*. That is the second point. Insurrection must rely upon such a *critical moment* in the history of the growing revolution when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its height, and when the *vacillations* in the ranks of the enemy and *in the ranks of the weak, half-hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution are strongest*. This is the third point."

Lenin emphasised that without these conditions "it would be not only folly but a crime" to throw the advanced contingent into decisive battle.

It must be noted that although we continue to be at the same strategic stage of the Indonesian revolution, the conditions for

gaining the leading role for the proletariat are today much more difficult than in the 1950s. All the more, therefore, does this give grounds for setting the task, parallel with the general strategic objective, of overthrowing the military fascist dictatorship in Indonesia and creating a government which would ensure the independence and sovereignty of the Indonesian state, guarantee democratic rights and freedoms and take steps to implement the aspirations of the workers and peasants, of broad sections of society.

URGENT TASKS AHEAD

Such a government can only appear as a result of a fundamental change of the alignment of class forces in favour of the revolution. Bitter experience has shown the Indonesian people that the communists were right when they warned of the danger from the rightwing to the Republic of Indonesia. All genuinely patriotic forces of the people must be called upon to create an anti-imperialist national unity front with the participation of communists.

The struggle for the formation of the NUF with the ultimate aim of setting up a people's government must be founded on a realistic assessment of the true balance of political forces *within the country*. The slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the immediate task will only frighten away the middle forces of the peasants and intellectuals and remove the prospect of their alliance with the communists.

Haste and the leaping over a stage of the revolution that has not yet been passed only play into the hands of the enemies of the revolution.

What are the most urgent tasks of the communists of Indonesia?

1. The struggle to rehabilitate the party in the eyes of the broad masses, to restore and strengthen its ideological prestige, i.e., the teaching of Marxism-Leninism among the Indonesian

people, and to overcome anticommunist sentiments is the major task of all genuine communists of Indonesia. First and foremost, we must explain to the masses that the responsibility for the errors of the past devolves not on the PKI with its three million members and not on any one man, but on a group of leaders who, in effect, fenced themselves off from the party and deliberately or unwittingly represented interests alien to the party and objectively counterposed themselves to the entire party and the world working-class and communist movement; that far from conforming with the decisions of the PKI and the line of the international communist movement, the political line of this group diverged from them; that the ideological slogans of this group were based not on Marxism-Leninism but, on the contrary, clashed with its principles and played into the hands of the splitters. *It is quite obvious that the future of the Communist Party of Indonesia directly depends on an immediate, determined and open dissociation from these people and this depends on the consolidation of the party's independence and its deliverance from the harmful influence of Mao Tse-tung.*

2. *In order to restore the party it is absolutely vital to create and strengthen a staunch Marxist-Leninist nucleus of leaders who would be capable of working in the underground for a long time in extremely difficult and dangerous conditions.* This nucleus must consist of carefully selected comrades who are devoted to the revolution. In view of the obtaining situation this nucleus must not be numerous. On the other hand, instead of being a hindrance, the fact that the nucleus would be numerically small would help to enhance its influence and strengthen its role as the leader of the party ranks. Its cadres must combine great courage with the strictest adherence to the rules of underground work, vigilance and caution, without which it is impossible to ensure the life of the party. In this Marxist-Leninist nucleus there must be absolute unity of views on ideological and organisational problems as well as iron discipline. This nucleus must ensure contact with groups of communists in the localities not by sending its own cadres to

direct the work of local organisations but by training and steeling experienced and tested party cadres in each district.

3. Lenin teaches that the launch ng of a real mass struggle must be preceded by long painstak ng and careful work aimed at form ng a strong party capable of sufficiently great endurance. He wrote:

> 'Objective conditions requ re that the foundation of the party organisation should consist of small illegal workers' cells correspond ng to the forms of the struggle. These cells must display cons derably more initiative and independence, especially as frequently they will be unable to obtain assistance from senior more experienced comrades. These cells w ll be unable to carry out the task of constantly influencing the masses and maintaining relations of mutual assistance with them without firstly, establishing firm contact with each other and, secondly, without creating bases in the shape of various legal organs."

This advice, given by Len n in 1910, when counter-revolutionary terror reigned in tsarist Russia, may be applied by the Marxists-Leninists of Indonesia to the task of restoring the party of the working class. As regards the admittance of peasants to party membership, this as Lenin said, is "not abnormal or dangerous *provided* the proletarian party can re-educate these elements who come from without and subordinate them instead of becoming subord nated to them" (emphasis by Lenin). This extremely pertinent advice from Lenin was forgotten by the PKI leadership. But it must not be forgotten again The Indonesian communists must always bear in mind that a proletarian party is being restored and that the nonproletarian cadres in it must be re-educated in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

4. *The issue of periodicals of the PKI must not be delayed by the party's Marx st-Leninist nucleus.* Firstly, the healthy forces of the Communist Party will rally round such period cals· secondly, such publications will make it possible clearly to demarcate anti-Leninist groups and expose the anti-Marx st

nature of their pseudorevolutionary slogans thirdly we can use Marxist-Leninist publications for a campaign to rehabilitate the party in the eyes of the masses fourthly, by reading these publications, the communists and nonparty people will see that the PKI is pursuing a Marxist-Leninist policy fifthly, these publications will help directly in the struggle against the present regime, exposing the real meaning of the new order', its antipopular and antinational policy, showing the masses the horrible danger of Indonesia's conversion into a military-fascist state serving the interests of the imperialist monopolies in other words, they will give rise to a popular resistance movement against the present regime and help to form the NUF.

5. In view of the fact that at present Marxists-Leninists are taking only the first steps towards the restoration of the PKI, that the workers and peasants of Indonesia are terrorised demoralised and intimidated into passivity that both these class forces are not yet ready to follow the communists that, as a result Marxists-Leninists do not as yet have a mass political army, we cannot consider an armed uprising as an effective and the basic or only form of struggle at the present stage When the party is smashed and lies bleeding, when the forces of the revolution are paralysed, the working class is disorganised and terrorised and no revolutionary situation exists, the slogan of "an immediate mass armed struggle" is tantamount to suicide and, objectively, a provocation leading to the destruction of the numerically small forces at the disposal of the underground Marxist-Leninist organisation. *Nonetheless, the party cadres must be prepared for an armed struggle.*

The idea that Marxism does not bind the movement to any one particular form of struggle' and that it 'positively does not reject any form of struggle" is clearly expressed in all of Lenin's works. Following the great leader of the world proletariat Stalin said: "The task of the party is to master all forms of struggle, to be able to use them on the battlefield and skilfully sharpen the struggle in precisely those forms that best suit the specific situation." Lenin pointed out that the implementation of one

form of struggle or another depends on the level of development of the masses on their consciousness, and on the real balance of forces at different stages of the revolution.

Marxism, Lenin said,

> "recognises the most varied forms of struggle, and it does not 'concoct' them but only generalises, organises, gives conscious expression to these forms of struggle of the revolutionary classes which arise of themselves in the course of the movement".

In the polemic with rightwing opportunists, Lenin pointed out that the armed struggle in 1905 "was *inevitably* the outcome of the *entire* course of development and not the result of the subjective desire of some groups or parties" (emphasis by Lenin).

Lenin sharply condemned any attempt in principle to avoid an armed struggle, including a guerrilla struggle. Guerrilla warfare", Lenin wrote,

> "is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the 'big engagements' in the civil war."

Along with an uprising, guerrilla warfare in a civil war is one of the most acute forms of the class struggle. When the party considers it opportune to start guerrilla operations communist guerrillas use in these operations all forms of violence against the class enemy, against the imperialists. Besides killing the enemy in battle, guerrillas hunt and execute provocateurs, confiscate money from the enemy, raid prisons and administer revolutionary justice on hangmen. Genuine revolutionaries scorn those whose prattle about the 'immorality" of violent methods only screens their base cowardice. Armed action of this kind, which shows no mercy for enemies and traitors, does not under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, harm the working people. In the hands of communists weapons are

used exclusively to defend the interests of the people against the class enemy.

At the same time, under certain conditions Marxists-Leninists consider it is in the interests of the party and the people to refrain from armed action. In a period when reaction runs riot, when a "counter-revolutionary situation" obtains and a revolutionary upsurge is nonexistent (such an upsurge will not arise through solely the subjective desire of communists), the "specific task is to prepare and muster forces and not to take direct and determined action". That is what Lenin taught.

We can appreciate the mood of some rank-and-file communists who are eager to go into open battle to force the enemy to pay for the blood he has shed. These lofty feelings are played on by those who in blind and fanatic homage to the "thought" of Mao want to throw PKI members into battle so that they would perish without contributing anything to the struggle of the party, and yet these same people claim they are the "saviours and leaders" of the party. While recognising that "the forces of the counter-revolution are at present on the upswing", they nonetheless, in spite of logic, toy with the slogan calling for the immediate "armed struggle" of the whole people.

The principal task of the communists of Indonesia is to conduct political work among the masses, muster the revolutionary forces and, at the same time, assemble military cadres and prepare secret caches of weapons for armed action by the people under the leadership of the party. In the present situation the success of the efforts to muster a political army depends on carefully conducted explanatory and organisational work among the masses. We must flexibly combine illegal activity with activity in legal mass organisations where communists have the possibility of conducting work of an educational and organisational nature, namely in political parties, trade unions, cultural and other organisations, explaining to the deceived masses the aims and methods of the Communist Party's struggle. It is necessary to inject organisation into the spontaneous actions of the working people, above all of the workers, by

rendering the masses every possible assistance in the setting up of various associations and soc et es protecting their day-to-day interests: trade unions cooperatives, cultu ral, sports and mutual-aid societies, and so on.

6. *The con mun sts of Indonesia n ust display in tiat ve in exposing the demagogic subterfuges of the rul ig circles tear off their mask of "champions of the interests of the people' and show the people the true face of these c rcles.*

The ruling circles in Indonesia are now shouting from the rooftops that they intend to promote the welfare of the people and declare that what they call the "old order" is responsible for the present econom c dislocation. It is the duty of communists to show that the purpose of declarations of this kind is to conceal the enormous growth of bureaucratic capitalists, who are increasing their profits by exploiting the country's wealth that the present regime has done nothing tang ble to overcome economic difficulties, that, on the contrary, it is adding to these difficulties by its policy, that those who have been ruling the country s nce 1 October 1965 are respons ble for the drastic drop of the people's standard of l ving, that this reg me embodies and concentrates in itself the worst aspects of the "old order' and lastly that the rul ng clique cannot pursue any other policy because it is tied by a thousand strings to its masters, namely, the b g bourgeoisie the bureaucratic capitalists, the landowners, the swindlers, the corruptors and the profiteers.

The ruling clique has failed in its attempts to sh ft the blame for this drastic drop of the Indonesian people's living standard onto the PKI. At present it is trying to d rect the growing wrath of the people into the channel of chauvinism and racialism, mainly of anti-Chinese pogroms. It is the task of communists to show the masses that the ruling cl que itself is most of all interested in a growth of chauvinistic sentiments, that this clique hopes the wave of racialism and chauvinism will halt the growth of dissatisfaction with the present regime.

7. *The contradictions between the different rightwing groups must be skilfully utilised.* For example, if one rightwing group openly seeks to enter the military alliance being set up in South-East Asia by the imperialists headed by the USA, while another group, for one reason or another, directly or indirectly, actively or less actively opposes this policy, it must not be forgotten that both the one and the other are enemies. Here our tactics must be resolutely to oppose the imperialist policy of the first group, "support" the neutralist line which the second group expresses sincerely or by compulsion, and mobilise all forces in order to use the contradictions and discord between these groups to undermine their political positions.

8. One of the cardinal tasks of the party in the present situation is to wage a *ruthless struggle against traitors, provocateurs and spies in the underground organisation.* In this struggle we must remember Lenin's precept that the destruction of spies is the "*duty* of every honest person". *Any person who betrays the party and becomes a spy voluntarily, by compulsion or for money, must know that from the moment he begins his dirty provocative work he is under a sentence of death which will be infallibly carried out.*

Enhanced revolutionary vigilance and the ability to hunt down and expose traitors no matter what position they occupy in the party are an absolute condition for the restoration of the party and for the party's normal life.

9. In the situation prevailing at the present stage, the PKI cannot set as its direct objective the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat or the creation of a government founded on a political bloc with the participation and under the leadership of communists. Objectives of this kind are unrealistic. Alone the communists are unable to achieve these objectives, while the masses, the majority of workers, the majority of the working people are as yet not prepared to support the communists. Therefore, due to objective necessity, present demands can only be of a limited nature, above all of a

democratic nature, and this opens up the possibility of uniting the patriotic national forces and broad sections of the population on the basis of these demands.

After closely studying the present situation, we have come to the definite conclusion that the communists of Indonesia are prepared to support and fight for the following aims, which spring from life itself:

— a democratic, anti-imperialist national government representing the interests of peasants, workers, artisans, honest civil servants, progressive soldiers and officers, patriotic national entrepreneurs and other democratic elements;

— a determined struggle against the military fascist dictatorship in Indonesia, for the democratisation of the state apparatus and society; the holding of general elections while being fully aware that although under the military fascist dictatorship such elections cannot be free and democratic they will nonetheless provide the possibility, even if it is a limited one, of condemning the present regime;

— a drastic reduction and purge of the state apparatus, both military and civil, chiefly by expelling from it parasitical and antipopular elements, and the merciless denunciation of corruptors and the return to the state of the wealth pillaged by them;

— the immediate cessation of the reign of terror and the granting of a general amnesty to political prisoners;

— the abolition of the shameful law "banning" the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the cessation of the persecution of all progressive ideological trends;

— the immediate cessation of the policy of expelling left elements from political life and the state apparatus, and the discontinuance of the mass "purge" in the state apparatus and the Armed Forces;

— the overcoming of the economic decline and an improvement of the exceedingly difficult life of the working people;

— the consolidation and strengthening of the state sector in vital branches of the economy;

— the establishment of effective state control of the activities of private capital, of foreign private capital in particular;

— the adoption of a progressive labour law embracing all industrial and agricultural enterprises;

— the establishment, in view of the present inflation and economic decline, of an adequate standard of living for workers and other working people and the satisfaction of their day-to-day requirements;

— the provision to workers and other working people of the possibility of conducting an organised economic and political struggle for their rights and interests;

— the implementation of the law on crop division, the restriction of the right to land ownership, the banning of feudal and semifeudal methods of exploiting peasants, the prohibition of the practice of driving peasants from their land under any pretext, and the institution of a democratic system of village administration;

— the granting of state aid to national enterprises and the pursuance of a policy of preferences in customs tariffs;

— the implementation of a really free, active anti-imperialist and anticolonial foreign policy, the renunciation of military blocs, and cooperation with socialist countries, with developing Asian and African countries and with progressive forces in the capitalist states;

— firm and unshakable adherence to the following conditions for utilising foreign economic aid and for importing foreign capital: (1) outright renunciation of political concessions which the imperialists demand as a condition for granting credits and for the investment of capital; (2) an effective system of state control of the activity of foreign capital to safeguard our national interests.

FOR A NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

With the above programme it is evidently possible to create a national unity front incorporating various sections of society oppressed by the present regime and whose dissatisfaction cannot be openly expressed in political parties or other existing organisations. Such a front must not become the focal point of existing parties and organisations; it must be a new association whose object would be to win the masses over from reactionary organisations and attract rank-and-file members from these organisations.

On the basis of the above programme the front would facilitate the consolidation of all anti-imperialist forces in the country. However, even from the very birth of the NUF, every effort must be made to enhance the role of the workers and peasants in it, because without their active participation no alliance can grow strong enough to prepare the conditions for changing the balance of the political forces in the country in favour of the people.

At the same time, the Communist Party's participation in the NUF can be justified on the sole condition that it retains its ideological and organisational independence. Each communist or group of communists working in the NUF is subordinated first and foremost to the party leadership and implements the party's line in questions of cooperation with other parties and organisations. The Central Committee of the PKI or the provisional body deputising for it directs all military activity and prepares, in the event of necessity, the forces and facilities for joint action with other members of the NUF.

The unity of all national forces on an anti-imperialist and antifeudal basis, with the communists retaining complete ideological and organisational independence as an indispensable condition, fully embodies Lenin's teaching to the communists of the eastern countries in 1920. The correctness of this precept has been tested by time. Neglect of this inescapably leads to defeat and, on the contrary, if it is observed it opens the road to victory for the communist parties.

Every member of the PKI who in the present extraordinarily difficult situation decides to continue the struggle for the cause of the party and who remains devoted to Marxism-Leninism, must firmly remember an exceedingly important conclusion drawn by Lenin: The hegemony of the proletariat must *derive* from long, painstaking, persevering and planned work by the Marxist party to unite the democratic, progressive and anti-imperialist forces of the entire nation; recognition of this hegemony must by no means be made by communists a *preliminary condition* for the admittance of future allies to a united national front for a joint struggle against the common enemy. Such is the teaching of Lenin, and such is the experience of history.

Having drawn conclusions from what has been said above, the Marxists-Leninists of Indonesia put forward the following main tasks:

1. The restoration of the PKI on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

2. Persevering day-to-day work among the masses of town and countryside in defence of the interests of all working people, for the exposure of the antipopular, antinational essence of the military fascist dictatorship of General Suharto.

3. A struggle for the creation of the NUF consisting of all the patriotic forces of the nation on the basis of the programme of democratic aims.

4. Active and thorough preparations for an armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the antipopular regime and the setting up of a national-democratic front government with the participation of communists.

5. Restoration of unity and close cooperation with the international communist movement.

These five main tasks can be carried out only by a Marxist-Leninist leading nucleus consisting of communists who are

not associated with the errors of the past. Those who have soiled their name, have tried or are still trying to turn the Communist Party of Indonesia into a toady of Mao Tse-tung, and are unable to think and act freely and independently of Peking or anybody else must be resolutely kept out of the leadership.

At the same time, comrades from among the old leading cadres, who are able to head the implementation of an independent policy by the PKI and mobilise the broad masses for the struggle for their class interests must be enlisted into the work.

The situation in Indonesia bears evidence of the total failure of the antipopular policy of the ' new order". The squandering of Indonesia's national wealth into the hands of the imperialist monopolies and the offensive against workers, peasants and intellectuals is giving rise to mounting dissatisfaction among the masses.

The Communist Party of Indonesia has suffered a setback but its Marxist-Leninist cadres continue to live and work in order to draw conclusions from the errors of the past and continue the struggle for the triumph of the national-democratic revolution and socialism.

A great defeat, Lenin wrote, "gives the revolutionary parties and the revolutionary class a real and very useful lesson, a lesson in historic dialectics, a lesson in the understanding of the political struggle and in the skill and art of waging it".

Down with the military fascist dictatorship!

Long live national patriotism and proletarian internationalism!

Long live the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Indonesia!

With fresh inspiration, forward to the victory of the Indonesian Revolution under the red banner of Marxism-Leninism!

●